WORKSHOP 4

Strengthening campaigns to end the occupation and to realize the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people

Paper presented by

Mr. Tobias Schnebli
Member, Collectif Urgence Palestine
Geneva
Campaigns against arms trade and military collaboration with Israel

by Tobias Schnebli, member of Collectif Urgence Palestine (Geneva) email: tobia@gsoa.ch

Data sheets (mentioned as in Appendix) available from the author upon request

A key issue for Palestine-solidarity and antiwar campaigns

Since the end of the Oslo peace process and the outburst of the second Intifada, European and North-American movements supporting the Palestinian people's struggle for freedom have attempted to exert different forms of pressure, directly and through their own governments, on the state of Israel in order to bring it to comply with international law and to recognize the Palestinian people's rights to self-determination.

International military cooperation and arms trade with Israel has been one of the main issues of such campaigns these last years. The main interest for focusing on this issue is that it addresses the military means used by the State of Israel to enforce its illegal policies of occupation, colonization of the land and oppression of the Palestinian people as well as its repeated military attacks against other populations of the area. Israel's army constantly violates international law and international humanitarian law (IHL), in particular the Geneva Conventions for the protection of civilians. The military means used to perpetrate these violations include the Israeli army, its weapons and also the industrial and technical capacities needed to produce them.

Several campaigns on this issue have gathered a very broad support in European civil societies. As long as Israel will keep denying and violating the rights of the Palestinian people, military cooperation and arms trade with Israel will continue to be an issue for forces involved in support and solidarity with the struggle of the Palestinian people.

Also, for a number of reasons, the degree of militarization of Israel and the international links of its security policy will not diminish in the near future.

1) Israel's security policy continues to rely above all on exerting its position of military superiority versus all the other countries of the Middle East. Supplies of arms and arms components to Israel from abroad will continue to be vital for maintaining this position.

2) Israel's politics of repression and control of the Palestinian's struggle will continue to employ a large array of military and police instruments.

3) Israel occupies a forefront position in three main strategic "global conflict" domains: as military bastion of the North-West in the Middle East where more than half of the world's oil reserves are located; acting in a front line position in the "global war against terrorism" and as a part of the barrier Europe is building up to keep immigration from the global South under control. The full integration of Israel's army into NATO's "Active Endeavour" operation (the permanent patrolling of the Mediterranean sea since 2001 against "illegal trafficking and terrorism") is a most recent step in the fulfillment of this strategic position.

4) Israel's "security" sector has gained an important share of the global market for arms and security services. The "openness", i.e. the transnational capital invested and the international connections of the chains of production and distribution of the "homeland security" and weapons market make Israel an ever more sensible "global player" in this market.
The recent decision of the U.S. administration to boost military aid to Israel up to 30 billion USD for the next 10 years further confirms Israel's heavy dependency on militarization.

**Stop arms trade with Israel: similar arguments in different contexts**

In recent years, European and North-American campaigns against arms trade and military collaboration with Israel have addressed three main themes:

- Stop or suspend arms exports to Israel
- Stop or suspend military collaboration with Israel
- Stop or suspend arms imports from Israel

Often these themes are combined in a common campaign.

Most evident arguments exist for campaigns calling to stop arms exports to Israel since weapons delivered to Israel are directly used for oppressive and destructive policies systematically violating international law and IHL and perpetrating war crimes.

Similarly sound arguments exist against military collaboration (exchanges between armies and armaments industries, common military exercises and operations). To collaborate with an army (or with its arms-manufacturing industrial base) who systematically violates IHL and human rights means that one is also an accomplice of these war crimes and violations of IHL.

Campaigning against arms imports from Israel may appear more problematic at first sight. Here the main argument is that such purchases contribute to strengthen Israel's arms-manufacturing industry which is an essential part of the instrument used by Israel to implement its policies of human rights and international law violations. In fact, arms imports (as well as exports and military collaboration) are in contradiction with the obligations clearly stated in IHL. In fact, as recently stated also by the International Court of Justice, all contracting parties must ensure the compliance with international humanitarian law by other states (like Israel) who are violating it.

In the UK, a country who exports and imports weapons to and from Israel, the latest ongoing campaign "Stop arming Israel" actually demands not only to stop exporting arms or parts of weapon systems (like for the F-16 fighter planes and Apache helicopters) but also for a complete embargo on arms purchases from Israel:

**Stop Arming Israel Statement:**

In 2005 the UK government licensed the sale of £22.5m worth of arms to Israel, more than twice the amount in 2004, and has spent millions of pounds on 'battletested' arms from Israeli companies. Equipment licensed by the UK Government for supply to Israel includes weapon control systems, ammunition, components for various types of missiles, and key parts for Israel's Apache attack helicopters and F16 fighter jets. These have been deployed against civilian populations in southern Lebanon and Gaza, as well as to maintain the illegal occupation of the Palestinian Territories.

We, the undersigned, call on the UK government to initiate an immediate embargo on both arms sales to Israel and arms purchases from Israeli military industry. We also urge other governments to do likewise.

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1 ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall... point 159; "all the States parties to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 are under an obligation, while respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention."

2 www.stoparmingisrael.org/statement/
Considering some recent campaigns on these themes, one can conclude that the concrete object of a campaign (arms exports or imports, cooperation) is relatively less important in respect to other factors, like the political or social broadness with which such campaigns are conducted and of course the political and cultural context of the country.

In Switzerland, a country which does not officially export arms to Israel, campaigns since 2002 have called for a suspension of purchases of arms and military equipment from Israel and in the same time for a suspension of joint arms manufacturing between Israeli and Swiss arms manufacturers and also the suspension of visits and other exchanges between Swiss and Israeli armies. The most recent significant campaign took place in 2005-2006 against the purchase of 100 million Euro worth of military radio surveillance and jamming system equipment manufactured by Israeli Aircraft Industries-Elta systems Ltd.

Even though these campaigns did finally not obtain a majority in the Parliament votes, they did achieve a remarkable political breadth and public impact. They united the entire spectrum of the swiss political left (including the greens and the social democrats) and even some representatives of the centre parties as well as several major development and humanitarian aid NGOs.

But the impact of such campaigns also depends very much on the political and cultural context. For instance in Germany, where it is almost impossible to overcome the historical justification for the official ongoing and uninterrupted support for Israel, campaigns against arms trade with Israel have much less chances to have an impact. To the present, no significant political opposition seems able to seriously question the delivery of 2 new Dolphin class submarines with nuclear arms capacity to the Israeli navy (a €1billion deal, one third of which paid by German taxpayers, agreed upon in summer 2006).

**European and U.S. arms sales to Israel**

Compared to Israel's dependency on U.S. military sales and aid from the U.S., the exports of arms by European countries to Israel are of secondary importance, but not negligible.

**Table 1. Arms sales and deliveries to Israel 2001-2005, in million €**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>U.S. sales</th>
<th>U.S. military aid</th>
<th>EU total</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>U.K.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>3'095</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>2'927</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>3'314</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1'038</td>
<td>2'100</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2'210</td>
<td>2'088</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 2001-05</td>
<td>5'534</td>
<td>13'524</td>
<td>828</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of EU total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>43,8%</td>
<td>31,9%</td>
<td>13,8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Current prices. Data for the U.S. from Frida Berrigan and Wiliam D. Hartung, World Policy Institute Brief, 2006. U.S. sales data from Table 1 (totals Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales). U.S. military aid data from Table 2 which totals "Foreign Military Financing"

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(direct military aid) plus "Economic Support Fund" (open-ended monetary assistance that can be used to offset military spending and arms purchases) plus "Supplementals" and "NADR-ATA" (Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining & Related Programs). Conversion factors USD to Euros: 1,10 for 2001; 1,05 for 2002; 0,90 for 2003; 0,80 for 2004 and 2005. Data for EU countries: own calculations. Figures are "values of arms exports licences issued". Source: Official Journal of the European Union, 2006/C 250/01 Eighth annual report according to operative provision 8 of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. Previous years: 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th annual reports.

Table 1 shows that arms sales from European countries to Israel between 2001 and 2005, represent something around 15% of the armament the United States furnished to Israel during the same period. Even though challenged by a spectacular rise of French weapons exports to Israel in the last two years, Germany's position of being the largest European arms supplier to Israel will probably stay unchanged, also considering delivery of the submarines mentioned above.

**Israeli arms exports and connections to the global arms market**

In Israel the traditional national military-industrial complex is adapting itself to the structural transformations (international opening) and to the technological revolution in the defence market. Still, three (IAI, Rafael and IMI) of the four Israeli firms listed in the world's top 100 arms manufacturers are state owned.

### 4 Israeli companies listed in the world's 100 largest arms producing companies 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Arms sales (million $)</th>
<th>Profits(million $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI)</td>
<td>14'570</td>
<td>1'370</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elbit Systems</td>
<td>5'500</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafael</td>
<td>5'170</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel Military Industries (IMI)</td>
<td>2'400</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Arms exports are a very important aspect of Israel's military-industrial sector. In 2001, according to the Israeli defence ministry, Israel supplied 10 per cent of total world military exports. That year, Israel's military production reached $3.6bn of which only $900m-worth of equipment was bought by Israel's defence ministry for the IDF. In other words, Israel exported 75 per cent of the total production of its military industries⁴.

This proportion was maintained in 2006. According to data released by Israel's "Foreign Defense Assistance and Defense Export Department" (SIBAT), weapons exports from Israel in 2006 amounted to $4.4bn, a new high, placing Israel on rank five worldwide. The main importers of Israeli weapons in 2006 were India with $1.5bn (including $450m for naval antimissile system "Barak") and the USA with $1bn. "Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yossi Ben-Hanan, head of SIBAT said he hoped that the European market - which made up $800 million in contracts - would increase in the coming years. 'We need to create partnerships with European countries, which the Israeli defense industries could use to market their products'.⁵

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⁵ "Israel defense sales hit record", Jerusalem Post 01-01-2007.
According to the 2006 Report of the U.S. Congressional Research Service Israel now occupies rank six among suppliers of conventional weapons to the world considering sales contracts in the years 2001-2005\(^6\). China, India and Turkey are the emerging markets for the Israeli arms industry, but Europe is of capital importance for the possibilities it offers for cooperation with Israeli firms in industrial production and Research and Development capacities.

The growing international links of Israeli arms industries through acquisitions, mergers and partnerships with US and European companies make clear assessments difficult to establish also for the most authoritative researchers. SIPRI Yearbook 2006 states:

*Although Israel has gained an international reputation in the field of military exports, the level of performance is difficult to establish. (...) Most Israeli exports consist of small arms, ammunition, electronics and modernized weapons, for which there are no reliable data. Exports are also difficult to identify because non-Israeli companies market Israeli-made goods or produce them under licence. Israeli companies establish partnerships with European companies, partly to penetrate protected markets, but also because buying weapons from Israel may be politically controversial. According to Rafael, the producer of the Spike anti-tank missile, it is more comfortable for European customers to buy from Eurosipke than from Israeli Rafael'. Finland, the Netherlands, Poland and Romania ordered Spike missiles from Eurosipke, established in 1997 by Rafael and German Diehl and Rheinmetall. Rafael also sells Litening targeting system via Zeiss, a German company\(^7\).*

**RAFAEL, an example for a Hi-tech and internationally linked arms industry**

Rafael based in Haifa, Israel, manufacture the Spike family of anti-armour weapons. The weapons are lightweight fire-and-forget anti-tank missiles and use electro-optical and fibre-optic technologies. The systems are used by infantry soldiers, special rapid reaction forces, ground forces and helicopter aircrew. In October 2003, the Israel Defence Force (IDF) awarded a production contract for Spike C4I, the Spike-ER system fitted with networking capability. The Spike launcher will be fitted with a variant of the Azimuth Comet Global Positioning System (GPS), laptop computer and VHF datalink.

In June 2004, a joint venture company, EuroSpike GmbH, was formed by Rafael with Rheinmetall Defence Electronics (formerly STN Atlas Elektronik) and Diehl Munitionssysteme (DMS). This followed a co-operation agreement signed by the three companies in November 1998. EuroSpike GmbH is the prime contractor for the Spike family of missiles in Europe. In January 2004, Poland signed a contract with ZM Mesko for the purchase of the Spike-LR missile system. ZM Mesko will manufacture elements of the missiles and perform final assembly from 2006. The requirement is for 264 tripod launchers and 2,675 missiles. Deliveries began in November 2004 and will conclude in 2013. Poland also requires 160 systems to be integrated on the Oto Melara HITFIST 30 turret mounted on Patria Armoured Modular Vehicles. The system is also being trialled by the Romanian Army.\(^8\)

Beside the four big "conventional" weapons manufacturers mentioned above, there is a large industry and services sector responding to the growing demand of the "security and safety" market. "Israel anticipates a significant worldwide growth in budgets for homeland security, counter-terrorism and asymmetric warfare, especially in the areas of installations protection, border systems, bio-terror

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\(^7\) SIPRI Yearbook 2006:462.

prevention, data security, and access control (through biometric screening)\(^9\). A quick look at the different categories listed in the "Security & Safety" sector of the Israel Business Directory gives an idea of the diversity and importance of this business.

From the website of the Israel Export & International Cooperation Institute [www.export.gov.il](http://www.export.gov.il) (number of listed companies in brackets):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access Control</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biometrics</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4I</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consulting, Training and Services</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electro Optics</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrusion Detection</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT Security and Software</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Enforcement, First Responders</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC/CBRN</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation and UAV's</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perimeter Security</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Protection</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety and Rescue</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensors, Detection and Screening</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tracking and Motion Detection</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video Surveillance</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
- **C4I**: Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence
- **Consulting, Training and Services**: include private military societies
- **IT**: Information technology
- **Law Enforcement**: from anti-riot tear gas to heavy artillery ammunition
- **NBC/CBRN**: Nuclear Biological Chemical/Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear
- **UAV's**: Unmanned Air Vehicles

**Defence & Homeland Security trades: more insight is needed**

Some excellent work is already being done. The researches published by the Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) in the U.K.\(^{10}\) which can be seen as a reference work must be mentioned here.

The complete picture however will hardly be available, for two main reasons.

- First, arms trade is traditionally of the less transparent kind, because it has always been a politically highly sensitive matter and recently also because of the growing international connections and ramifications through mergers and acquisitions of arms producers.

- The second main difficulty lays in the definition of arms, military equipment and other war-instruments employed in the new kind of warfare taking place under the supposedly "global and unending war on terror". This new warfare has undergone the "Revolution in Military Affairs" with "information" as a key element and seeks to respond to the new characteristics of "asymmetric" wars. The "war on terror" and the "clash of civilizations" have considerably broadened the array of the instruments used to defeat, neutralize or control the enemy. The "Security & Safety" sector mentioned above is taking a growing part in this new warfare but its definition, let alone the quantification and the statistical analysis of its production and trade, remains, to our knowledge, yet to be done.

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The collection of information in the data sheets (see Appendix) seeks an overview on arms trade and military collaboration between Israel and European countries. It is largely based on "conventional arms" trade data. Besides the limits mentioned above, there still is a considerable amount of data which should be added lot of research to do, especially in Eastern European countries, where some indices suggest a very strong growth of exchanges and transfers of a multitude of arms and "security" related trade.

Hopefully, with some help from concerned campaigners and researchers worldwide, it will be possible to add more data to give a picture closer to the reality of the arms and "warinstruments" exchanges, and of the military collaborations between Israel and European countries.

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